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In this paper I illustrate the relations in which experiments stand to hypotheses, laws, and 
principles in Immanuel Kant’s natural philosophical methodology. My aim is not to provide a
rational reconstruction of Kant’s philosophy of experiment or to assess its internal coherence, 
but to illustrate it by contrasting it with an alternative conception of experiment that had a 
widespread following in the early modern period. This is the philosophy of experiment that 
was first sketched by Francis Bacon and later developed by Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke.
Needless to say, Bacon, Boyle, and Hooke are neither the first, nor the only philosophers to 
comment on the nature and functions of experiments before Kant. However, Bacon, Boyle, 
and Hooke provided a fairly elaborated and extremely influential set of reflections on the 
nature, types, and functions of experiments. Their philosophy of experiment embodies a set 
of beliefs and attitudes ‒ such as the focus on fact-gathering and the rejection of hypotheses 
‒ that were widely held in the second half of the seventeenth century, among others, by many
English natural philosophers and members of the Royal Society, the Florentine Accademia 
del Cimento, and the early French Academy of Sciences. A similar emphasis could be found 
in many British and French authors throughout the eighteenth century.i
Sketching a history of the anti-hypotheticalism that characterizes the Bacon-Boyle-Hooke 
view of experiment, Larry Laudan claims that it was endorsed by “most scientists and 
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epistemologists” from the 1720s to the end of the eighteenth century. Laudan mentions Kant 
as one of the authors for whom “the method of hypothesis is fraught with difficulties” 
(Laudan 1981, p. 10). In contrast to Laudan, I will argue that Kant’s view on the relations 
between experiments on the one hand and hypotheses, laws, and theories on the other hand, is
best seen as an alternative to the aversion to hypotheses and sharp contrast between 
experiments and speculations that characterizes the Bacon-Hoyle-Hooke view of experiment.
Kant often emphasizes the importance of experiments for natural science. Experiments, 
together with observations, are “the single road of natural science” (Kant 1922, vol. 11, p. 
142)ii and “the source” of physics (Kant 1936-1938, vol. 22, p. 331).iii They enable us to 
discover “the properties of object[s] of outer senses” (Kant 1922, p. 142 - trans. modified) 
and the laws of nature (Kant 1966f, pp. 8157‒9, and 89848). Empirical physics entered “the 
highway of science” only when Galileo, Torricelli, and Stahl followed “the suggestion of the 
ingenious Francis Bacon” (Kant 1781/1787, Bxii; 1980, p. 107) and started performing 
experiments:
When Galileo rolled balls of a weight chosen by himself down an inclined plane, or when 
Torricelli made the air bear a weight that he had previously thought to be equal to that of a 
known column of water, or when in a later time Stahl changed metals into calx and then 
changed the latter back into metal by first removing something and then putting it back again, a
light dawned on all those who study nature [...] (Kant 1781/87, Bxiii)
Galileo’s, Torricelli’s, and Stahl’s experiments are not only the basis for what Kant regarded 
as a scientific revolution (“a sudden revolution in the way of thinking,” (Bxii). They are also 
the basis for a revolution in metaphysics, which Kant undertakes in the Critique of Pure 
Reason. Its method “consists in this: to seek the elements of pure reason in that which admits 
of being confirmed or refuted through an experiment” (Bxviii). Kant’s “experiment of pure 
reason” (Bxxi n.; 1793, p. 291) aims to set metaphysics on the same “secure path of a 
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science” (Kant 1781/1787, Bix) on which physics entered thanks to Galileo’s and Torricelli’s 
experiments. In the theoretical field, the experiment of pure reason will enable Kant to 
explain the nature, extent, and limits of a priori knowledge (Kant 1781/1787, B6, A3/B7, 
A57/B81; 1783, p. 276; Seigfried 1989). In the practical field, that experiment will clear the 
ground for the new foundations of morality which Kant articulates in the Critique of 
Practical Reason (Kant 1781/1787, Bxxiv‒xxx; Sato, 2008).
Despite his claims on the importance of experiments, Kant was not an experimenter (Adickes
1924 25, vol. 1, pp. 6 11; vol. 2, pp. 484 and 487),‒ ‒ iv although he was aware of many results 
of the experimental sciences of his day. Kant’s writings do not contain any accurate 
experimental report or discussion of the practical aspects of experiments. The Kantian corpus 
does not provide any detailed, self-contained discussion of what an experiment is, except for 
a claim that was customary among Kant’s German contemporaries (Lambert 1764, vol. 1, pp. 
351 53; Erxleben 1772, §4). This is the claim that, by means of experiments, we ‒ intervene in
nature, placing objects in states in which they would not otherwise be (Kant 1980, pp. 102‒
3).v By contrast, observations do not modify the state in which observed objects are. 
Accordingly, we can perform experiments on animals and the medium-sized objects that we 
have at hand, but not on distant stars and planets, because we cannot modify the state they are
in.vi
Despite his apparent disinterest in the practical aspects of experiments, Kant provides 
reflections on three important topics in the philosophy of experiment. These are the relations 
of experiments to hypotheses, laws of nature, and the heuristic principles that guide scientific 
inquiry.vii I will reconstruct these relations in Sects. 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 of the paper, after 
sketching the Bacon-Boyle-Hooke conception of experiment in Section 7.1.viii Some critical 
remarks are provided in Section 7.5.ix
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7.1 Bacon, Boyle, and Hooke
According to Bacon, Boyle, and Hooke, the main function of experiments is not testing 
theories or enabling us to discover the laws of nature. It is providing data, factual information
on the properties and behaviour of bodies in determinate circumstances.
Experiments aimed primarily to verify or falsify theories were eschewed because Bacon, 
Boyle, and Hooke conceived of natural philosophical inquiry as a two-stage process (Hooke 
1705, p. 7). The first stage was the construction of natural histories, that is, structured 
collections of a large number of facts on designated topics (Boyle 1666). The second stage 
was the development of theories on the basis of the information collected. This second stage 
was to be initiated after the completion of the first stage (Boyle 1662, p. 12). Compiling 
natural histories was an enormous endeavor which would occupy many generations of 
researchers. As a consequence, theory construction was seen as a task which could only be 
accomplished in a distant future (Parker 1666, pp. 45 46).‒
To be sure, Boyle and Hooke claimed that it is useful to know the main theories which are 
available on a given topic in order to design experiments (Boyle 1666, p. 2; Hooke, 1705, p. 
19). However, they were wary of drawing general conclusions from observations and 
experimental results. For instance, Boyle regarded the so-called Boyle’s law as a 
generalization, observed to be true in specific places, but he was reticent to say that it is 
universally valid (Boyle 1662, p. 60).x
Bacon, Boyle, and Hooke held that one should perform experiments in a state of mind which 
is as free from theoretical assumptions as possible (e.g. Hooke, 1705, p. 20). Otherwise, one 
will easily fall prey to the prejudices (the famous Baconian idola (Bacon 1620, part 1, §61).) 
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which often thwart our endeavors to discover truth. Accordingly, Boyle and Hooke professed 
themselves adherents of experimental philosophy.xi They counseled against the premature 
formulation of theories, systems, and hypotheses (e.g. Hooke 1665, sig. A4).xii These were 
distinctive marks of speculative philosophy, as the adversary of experimental philosophy was 
called (Boyle 1662, p. 12; Hooke 1665, sig. a3, b1; Sprat 1667, p. 341; Anstey 2005; 
Gaukroger 2006, pp. 352 451).‒
The most frequent examples of speculative philosophy were Aristotelian and Epicurean 
natural philosophy and, later, Cartesian natural philosophy (Boyle 1666, p. 2).
With their factual and experimental approach, Bacon, Boyle, and Hooke, together with the 
members of the Royal Society and the other adherents to the program of experimental 
philosophy, gave an extraordinary impulse to the natural sciences. However, their aversion to 
speculation and hypotheses eventually undermined the Baconian research program of 
constructing natural histories. In the absence of organic links between experiments and 
observations on the one hand, and natural philosophical theories and hypotheses on the other, 
the mere accumulation of facts did not lead to the substantial progress in the explanation of 
the newly observed phenomena that experimental philosophers were expecting. It also did not
lead to the establishment of corpuscularianism which many “new philosophers” hoped would 
replace the traditional Aristotelian matter theory.xiii Therefore, it is not surprising that, after 
the publication of Newton’s Principia mathematica philosophiae naturalis in 1687, British 
natural philosophers were quick to embrace the new Newtonian model of natural 
philosophical inquiry.
Experiments and observations in the Principia are not aimed at the compilation of natural 
histories. They are aimed at the establishment of mathematical and nomological explanations 
of natural phenomena. By contrast, determinate nomological explanations were not central to 
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Bacon’s or Boyle’s natural philosophical projects. Newton claimed that the principles and 
laws which are the core of natural philosophical theories are deduced or induced from the 
phenomena. However, Newton did not spell out in detail how this deduction or induction 
takes place. Moreover, Newton continued to decry hypotheses and speculation. Like Bacon, 
Boyle, and Hooke, Newton “did not feign hypotheses”.xiv For Newton, as for Bacon and 
Boyle, experiments and hypotheses “were on different sides of the methodological divide” 
(Anstey unpublished). By contrast, according to Kant, experimental activity starts with the 
formulation of a hypothesis.
7.2 Experiments and Hypotheses
7.2.1 Experiments, Hypotheses, and Preliminary Judgements
Discussing “how we can discover the hidden qualities of natural bodies by means of 
experiment”, Kant states:
we must always first presuppose something here (begin with a hypothesis) from which to begin
our course of investigation [...] For to venture forth blindly, trusting good luck until one 
stumbles over a stone and finds a piece of ore and subsequently a lode as well, is indeed bad 
advice for inquiry (Kant 1798a, pp. 223‒24, italics added).
Unlike Bacon, Boyle, and Hooke, Kant holds that we neither can, nor should perform 
experiments in a theoretical void. Starting with a hypothesis is not only good experimental 
practice. It is also what every experimenter, more or less consciously, actually does: “[e]very 
man who makes experiments first makes hypotheses, in that he believes that this or that 
experiment will have these consequences” (Kant 1966f, p. 889).xv
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Hypotheses are not only important for experiments. They are the starting point of every 
activity which requires one to make judgements on the basis of uncertain grounds. “Thus a 
doctor makes hypotheses when he cures the sick[;] he has to subsume everything under 
hypotheses, and see whether the consequences that he now has before his eyes follow 
therefrom” (Kant 1966a, p. 220). A businessman makes a hypothesis when he “finds a ground
that is sufficient for undertaking something” (Kant 1966c, pp. 750 51). A general facing the ‒
enemy “must necessarily judge and decide something” on the basis of hypotheses (Kant 
1966c, pp. 750 51).‒
Bacon or Boyle could object that hypotheses may derive from prejudices and therefore they 
must be eschewed. Kant would agree that hypotheses derive from prejudices. However, he 
would add that, in line of principle, there is nothing wrong in having pre-judices, understood 
in the etymological sense of preliminary judgements. On the contrary, preliminary 
judgements are necessary for invention and discovery:
There has never been an inventor in the world, and there has never been anyone who invented 
something, who did not at the same time make a preliminary judgement concerning his 
invention and the invented thing. He was not certain of the thing, but the judgement cleared the
path for him to try, and to experiment (Kant 1966a, p. 162, trans. modified and italics added).xvi
The hypotheses to be tested by means of experiments are “half-judgements” (Kant 1966f, p. 
862), suppositions, and tentative assumptions about the properties and existence of objects 
and the laws and forces to which they are subjected.
Why should we believe that our inquiries always start with hypotheses and preliminary 
judgements? Kant’s texts contain two sets of considerations in support of this claim. First, 
Kant formulates pragmatic considerations, which are independent from his transcendental 
philosophy. Kant sketches several brief descriptions of the activities of doctors, judges, 
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miners, inventors, and experimenters. These descriptions are aimed to yield plausibility to the
view that inquiries in all these fields are based on hypotheses and preliminary judgements.
Second, Kant’s conception of the mind places a great emphasis on the active role of the 
human subject in shaping our experience of the world (Kant 1781/1787, A126). In Kant’s 
view, we continuously subsume the objects that we come by under concepts, such as those of 
substance and causality (B161, B164). We do this by formulating judgements about those 
objects (B143), even though we are normally unaware of this mental activity. If one endorses 
this view of the mind, it will be much easier to admit that we constantly frame hypotheses 
and preliminary judgements than it would be for those philosophers who deny the existence 
of unconscious mental contents. According to Kant, the preliminary judgements and 
hypotheses which are at the basis of our experiments are part of the continuous flow of our 
spontaneous activity of judgement (Kant 1961, p. 2432 33,36‒ ; 1998b, 359189 90‒ ).
7.2.2 Hypotheses and induction
Kant’s concise explanations of the notion of hypothesis employ several technical terms. It is 
helpful to unpack them in three steps:
1. Hypotheses are judgements that we regard as true: they are “a holding to be true” 
[Fürwahrhalten].
2. We hold them to be true because they explain the reasons for given phenomena. The 
metaphysics treatises of Kant’s eighteenth century German predecessors provided 
detailed treatments of the notion of reason in connection with the principle of 
sufficient reason (e.g. Crusius 1747, §§139‒54). Adopting their terminology, Kant 
states that hypotheses illustrate the Gründe, that is, the causes or reasons of given 
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phenomena. Having in mind the distinction between sufficient and insufficient reasons
(e.g. Crusius 1747, §143), Kant states that the reason expressed by a hypothesis must 
be sufficient to explain why the phenomena take place.
3. Hypotheses describe presuppositions [Voraussetzungen] (Kant 1966c, p. 7465; 1998a, 
p. 14614; 1800a, p. 848). They describe what must be preliminarily [voraus] posited 
[gesetzt], that is, exist or take place, for certain phenomena to take place.
The Jäsche Logic expresses all this as follows:
A hypothesis is a holding-to-be-true of the judgement of the truth of a ground for the sake of its
sufficiency for given consequences, or more briefly, the holding-to-be-true of a presupposition 
as a ground.
All holding-to-be-true in hypotheses is thus grounded on the fact that the presupposition, as 
ground, is sufficient to explain other cognitions as consequences (1800a, pp. 84 85).‒ xvii
For example, “I suppose that the earth has cavities, because on the basis of this [supposition] 
it is possible to explain how valleys arose; then I suppose the ground, because on the basis of 
it one can explain [its] consequences. This is a hypothesis” (Kant 1966d, p. 440).
The example makes clear that, when we formulate hypotheses, we follow a pattern of 
reasoning which leads us from certain events (the consequences) to their ground (R 2687 
[1776–89?], vol. 16, p. 471; Kant 1966c, p. 7465–7). On the face of it, this pattern of reasoning
would seem to be an abduction or an inference to the best explanation. Instead, Kant’s 
discussions of hypotheses mention induction. Hypotheses “are not taken to be true 
apodictically, but per inductionem” (Kant 1966e, p. 558).xviii “Induction” is a technical term 
for Kant. It designates the ascription of a property to all members of a class, on the ground 
that it belongs to some of them.xix
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Since Kant claims that hypotheses are the result of inductions, and the conclusions of 
inductions are universal judgements, Kant must hold that hypotheses are universal 
judgements. These are judgements of the form “all S are P”. However, this claim is 
implausible. Kant himself makes many hypotheses on the constitution of individual objects or
on the causes of just one event: for instance, the hypothesis that there is heated matter at the 
centre of the Earth (Kant 1800b, pp. 259 60; ‒ 1966f, p. 8877 8‒ ; 1998b, p. 377). In what 
follows, I will ignore this difficulty and presuppose Kant’s claim that hypotheses are 
universal judgements derived by induction.
7.2.3 Hypotheses, Certainty, and Probability
The claim that hypotheses are the conclusions of inductive inferences is the basis for Kant’s 
further claim that hypotheses cannot be certain.xx They do not enjoy the high epistemic status 
that early modern philosophers typically required for a statement to be part of the body of 
proper science, or scientia.
In Kant’s vocabulary, to be certain of a statement means to know that it is necessarily true.xxi 
For Kant, we can never know that a hypothesis is necessarily true. For universal statements, 
necessary truth goes hand in hand with “true or strict” generality, “i.e., in such a way that no 
exception at all is allowed to be possible” (Kant 1781/1787, B3‒4). However, we cannot 
know whether there is any exception to the state of affairs described by a hypothesis.
This is because hypotheses are universal statements established by induction on the basis of 
information gathered in the course of experience. However,
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Experience never gives its judgements true or strict but only assumed and comparative 
universality (through induction), so properly it must be said: as far as we have perceived, there 
is no exception to this or that rule (Kant 1781/1787, B3, italics added; see A24, A90/B124).
Experience cannot guarantee that a statement is necessarily true either, because necessity, 
together with strict universality, is a “secure” indication “of an a priori cognition” (B4; see 
A823/B851).
Kant’s contemporary Johann Georg Daries, among others, held that some inductions are the 
source of strictly universal judgements, of whose truth we can be certain. They are the 
inductions that are based on the enumeration of all members of a class (Daries 1776, §135). 
However, according to Kant, experience never gives us any guarantee that our enumerations 
are complete. For every given genus about which we make a generalization, there could be 
some members that we have not yet experienced and that are counterexamples to our 
generalization. The inductive employment of reason for devising hypotheses
is not properly constitutive, that is, not such that if one judges in all strictness the truth of the 
universal rule assumed as a hypothesis thereby follows; for how is one to know all possible 
consequences, which would prove the universality of the assumed principle if they followed 
from it? (Kant 1781/1787, A647/B675)
Therefore, “[h]ypotheses always remain hypotheses, that is, presuppositions, whose complete
certainty we can never attain” (Kant 1800a, p. 85).xxii They can only be more or less probable.
7.2.4 The Three Requirements for a Good Hypothesis
Not every hypothesis should be regarded as a possible explanation of natural phenomena. 
Kant details three requirements that every hypothesis must satisfy. In the first place, we must 
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be sure that whatever state of affairs the hypothesis adduces as an explanation for given 
phenomena can actually take place (Kant 1781/1787, A770/B798). To this end, the hypothesis
must be consistent with the body of our knowledge. “If, for example, to explain earthquakes 
and volcanoes we assume a subterranean fire, then such a fire must be possible, if not as a 
flaming body, yet as a hot one (Kant 1800a, p. 84; see Kant 1998b, p. 377). Hence, we should
not make the hypothesis that there are flames at the centre of the earth, because combustion 
would be impossible due to the lack of air (Kant 1800b, pp. 259 60). However, we can make‒
the hypothesis that the centre of the earth is composed of heated matter, because a body can 
be heated in absence of air.xxiii
In the second place, we must make sure that the events to be explained really follow from the 
assumed hypothesis. Otherwise, the hypothesis is “a mere chimera” (Kant 1800a, p. 85; see 
1966e, p. 5596 7‒ ; 1998b, p. 378635 37‒ ).xxiv
In the third place, a hypothesis must be sufficient to explain a whole set of phenomena, 
without the need to integrate it with further hypotheses.
Thus Tycho Brahe’s hypothesis, for example, did not suffice for the explanation of many 
appearances; hence he assumed several new hypotheses to complete it. Now here it is to be 
surmised that the assumed hypothesis cannot be the real ground. The Copernican system, on 
the other hand, is a hypothesis from which everything can be explained that ought to be 
explained therefrom, so far as it has yet occurred to us. Here we do not need any subsidiary 
hypotheses (hypotheses subsidiarias) (Kant 1800a, pp. 85 86; see Kant 1781/1787, ‒
A774/B802; 1966e, p. 559).
The prohibition to use subsidiary hypotheses prevents natural scientists from framing a whole
system out of hypotheses which integrate each other to form comprehensive explanations, but
are not systematically related to experiments and observations. An example of such a system 
is Descartes’ vortex theory, which for Locke and Newton was a paradigm example of an 
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unfounded speculative hypothesis (Anstey 2005, pp. 229 31). It is occasionally targeted in ‒
the Kantian corpus as well (Kant 1966a, p. 222; 1763, p. 144).xxv
Compliance with the three criteria ensures that we do not assume “mere chimeras” (Kant 
1966f, p. 88823), “empty figments of the brain” (1790, p. 46618), “empty fictions” (1966c, p. 
74619), “romances of reason” (1966a, p. 22033) or “daring adventure[s] of reason” (1790, p. 
419 n.) as hypotheses. These are typical expressions of the anti-hypothetical rhetoric to be 
found in the writings by Boyle, Hooke, or Locke (e.g. Locke 1976 89‒ , vol. 4, p. 628). They 
employed those expressions in their wholesale rejection of any hypothesis from the current 
stage of natural philosophy.
Kant, like his German contemporaries (e.g. Erxleben 1772, §9), employs the same 
expressions of seventeenth century British philosophers. However, unlike his British 
predecessors, Kant employs those expressions within a framework which is not hostile to 
hypotheses per se. Kant states that hypotheses, like castles in the air, are fictions, but not all 
fictions must be rejected. The power of imagination, kept “under the strict oversight of 
reason” (Kant 1781/1787, A770/B798), can give rise to useful “heuristic fictions” (1966a, p. 
26228). The three criteria laid out above discriminate castles in the air from heuristic fictions. 
The task of experiments is determining which heuristic fictions portray actual states of 
affairs, rather than mere possibilities.
7.3 Experiments and the Laws of Nature
Let us assume that we have a hypothesis which satisfies the three criteria and is confirmed by
experiments. What use shall we make of it? We saw in the introduction that, according to 
Kant, experiments help us discover the laws of nature. Laws of nature are expressed by 
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necessary statements. Kant regards this as an analytic truth: to say that something is a law is 
to say that it is necessary.xxvi Accordingly, in order to know that a statement expresses a law of
nature, we must know that it is necessarily true. However, experiments cannot confer 
certainty to a hypothesis, because experience cannot establish that a statement is necessarily 
true.xxvii Therefore, just by means of experiments, we cannot prove that a hypothesis is a law 
of nature (Kant 1783, p. 294).
Does this mean that experiments will never enable us to achieve the purpose they are meant 
to serve, that is, discovering the laws of nature? Kant does not draw such a pessimistic 
conclusion. He holds that testing hypotheses by means of experiments is necessary, but not 
sufficient, to discover the laws of nature. Experimental confirmation of a hypothesis is only 
the first step toward the discovery of a law of nature.
To illustrate this point, let us consider Copernicus’ heliocentric theory of planets. Copernicus’
“first thought” was a preliminary judgement: “the observer revolve[s],” whereas “the stars 
[...] [are] at rest” (Kant 1781/1787, Bxvi). “Copernicus assumed” this thought “only as a 
hypothesis” (Bxxii n.) This hypothesis proved to be superior to the Ptolemaic hypothesis and 
to Tycho Brahe’s hypothesis. Kant holds that, unlike the Tychonian hypothesis, the 
Copernican hypothesis does not require supplementary hypotheses (Kant 1966e, p. 559; 
1800a, pp. 85 86). Unlike the Ptolemaic hypothesis, the Copernican hypothesis explains all ‒
the phenomena. This confers a high degree of probability to the Copernican hypothesis (Kant 
1966f, p. 887), but it does not make it certain. What made it certain is the fact that it was 
subsumed under a body of laws:
The central laws of the motion of the heavenly bodies established with certainty what 
Copernicus assumed at the beginning only as a hypothesis, and at the same time they proved 
the invisible force (of Newtonian attraction) that binds the universe [...] (Kant 1781/1787, 
Bxxii n.)
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The same applies to the hypotheses that are confirmed by experiments. Experiments make 
them probable. The integration with a body of a priori laws and principles makes them 
certain. Thus
Reason, in order to be taught by nature, must approach nature with its principles in one hand, 
according to which alone the agreement among appearances can count as laws, and, in the 
other hand, the experiments thought out in accordance with these principles [...] (Kant 
1781/1787, Bxiii, italics added).
What principles must we employ to transform appearances into laws and how can we carry 
out this process? To answer these questions, we must enter the complex territory of Kant’s 
theory of the laws of nature. Two caveats are in place here. First, my outline will be highly 
selective. I will reconstruct Kant’s theory only to the extent which is necessary to understand 
how experiments enable us to discover new laws of nature. Second, my comments apply 
more neatly to Kant’s view of physical laws than to his view of biological laws. I privilege 
physical laws because most of Kant’s references to specific experiments relate to the field of 
physics, and not to biology.xxviii
There are laws of nature at three levels. At the first and highest level, we encounter the 
principles of pure reason. We can call them transcendental principles. They are eight highly 
general statements which describe features of our perception and features of natural objects 
and phenomena. For instance, a transcendental principle which describes features of our 
perception is: every sensation has a variable degree of intensity (Kant 1781/1787, B207). A 
principle which describes features of natural phenomena is the causal principle: “[a]ll 
alterations occur in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and effect” (B232). 
Among the transcendental principles, those which apply to natural objects and phenomena 
extend to physical phenomena and material objects, as well as to psychological phenomena 
(Kant 1783, p. 295). For example, the causal principle does not only apply to the alterations 
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of material objects. It also applies to mental states. Every change in our mental states is 
determined by a cause.
According to Kant, the transcendental principles can be proven to be true a priori, at least 
given Kant’s peculiar notion of a priori (Kitcher 2000, p. 17). This means that, although the 
proofs of the transcendental principles depend on premises concerning our cognitive 
capacities, they do not rely on any premise concerning particular experiences or features of 
objects that we can only know through experience. By contrast, a principle will be a 
posteriori in Kant’s sense if its proof relies on assumptions concerning particular experiences 
or features of objects that we can only know through experience.
Kant prefers to call the transcendental principles principles, rather than laws, in order to stress
that they lie at the basis of the system of our knowledge. To the extent that they concern 
natural objects, the transcendental principles are the most basic laws of nature (Kant 1783, p. 
319). “[T]hey are not themselves grounded in higher and more general cognitions” (Kant 
1781/1787, A148/B188).
At the second level, there are the metaphysical principles of natural science. Among these are
Newton’s laws of inertia and of action and reaction. Unlike the transcendental principles, the 
metaphysical principles do not apply to psychological phenomena, but only to material 
bodies. Like the transcendental principles, the metaphysical principles are known a priori.
This does not mean that experience or experiments are irrelevant to the metaphysical 
principles. First, we must have experience of the external world in order to acquire the 
concept of material body, without which we cannot even formulate the metaphysical 
principles. Second, experience might be necessary in order to discover them. Kant could well 
agree that we cannot discover the law of action and reaction without making appropriate 
experiences, such as the pendulum experiments that Newton details in the Principia.xxix 
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However, those experiments are not sufficient for us to prove the metaphysical principles. 
They cannot be, to use Locke’s famous expression, “Principles that Matter of Fact justifie” 
(Locke 1693, p. 248). This is because, being laws, they apply necessarily to every object that 
exists in space and time. Yet experience, experiments, and matters of fact cannot confer 
necessity to any judgement. Even if we discover the metaphysical principles empirically, we 
must prove them a priori, as Kant attempts to do in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural 
Science. If no a priori proof were available, we would have to deny that they are laws in the 
proper sense of the term.
At the third level, we find the empirical laws of nature. They apply to specific material 
objects and physical phenomena. We discover the empirical laws of nature a posteriori, on the
basis of observations and experiments (Kant 1781/1787, B263). We can prove them only by 
making reference to observations or experiments. Therefore, the empirical laws of nature, 
unlike the transcendental and metaphysical principles, are established only a posteriori.
Empirical laws of nature raise the same difficulty that we encountered earlier with reference 
to experiments. On the one hand, empirical laws “can only be known [...] empirically” and 
therefore, at least from the point of view of our understanding, “are contingent” (Kant 1790, 
p. 184, see pp.179‒80). On the other hand, empirical laws, being laws, must contain an 
element of necessity. Our understanding must think of them “as laws (i.e., as necessary)” 
(1790, 184). How can we confer necessity to laws that we can know “only empirically”? 
Since necessity cannot be established a posteriori, it must be established a priori. In Kant’s 
view, we have reason to regard empirical rules as necessary laws if we can relate them to the 
transcendental and metaphysical principles (Friedman 1992, p. 174). In order to confer 
necessity to an empirical rule, we must show that it follows from the a priori principles, in 
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addition to empirical premises.xxx Let us consider three examples to see how this process 
unfolds.
1. We have determined certain empirical regularities concerning the melting of wax and 
we want to formulate an empirical law of nature. We could then prove that the 
statements describing those regularities follow from a priori principles, such as the 
causal law and the law of action and reaction, together with empirical statements 
describing properties of wax.
2. We have formulated statements describing how a billiard ball moves when it is hit by 
other balls. We could then derive those statements from the causal principle, 
metaphysical principles, and information on the weight and shape of billiard balls.
3. Faced with Kepler’s laws of planetary motion, we could prove that they follow from 
metaphysical principles such as the law of inertia and the law of action and reaction 
(Friedman 1992, pp. 175‒80).
In each of these cases, we start from empirical regularities which we have established a 
posteriori. Then we attempt to subsume them under a priori principles. If we succeed in this 
attempt, we will have reason to regard the statements describing those regularities as 
“something radically new” (Friedman 1992, p. 178), that is, as descriptions of necessary 
features of reality.xxxi
The process which leads from a hypothesis to an empirical law of nature is represented in 
Fig. 7.1. The point of departure for this process is a hypothesis which is derived by induction.
To begin with, we should assess whether the hypothesis satisfies the three requirements 
discussed in Section 7.2.4. If it does not, we must abandon it. Otherwise, we must approach it
holding, in Kant’s words, experiments in one hand and principles in the other (Kant 
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1781/1787, Bxiii). First, we must perform experiments or carry out observations to confirm 
or disprove the hypothesis. Then, if the hypothesis is confirmed, we must attempt to relate it 
to the principles which are the basis of natural science. If we succeed in doing so, then the 
hypothesis could be an empirical law of nature.
Fig. 7.1: Process from hypotheses to empirical laws
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I stated that it could be a law of nature, and not that it will certainly be a law of nature, 
because other operations may be involved in our search for natural laws. For instance, we 
may have to choose between two incompatible hypotheses, both of which are confirmed by 
the observational evidence and can be integrated with a priori principles. Alternatively, we 
may have to submit our experiments, hypotheses, and explanations to the scientific 
community. We may be entitled to claim that a hypothesis is a law of nature only when some 
degree of intersubjective agreement is reached. This would conform to Kant’s repeated claim 
that people’s agreement, and especially the agreement of the learned community, with our 
opinions provides a reason to hold them true (Kant 1781/1787, A820 21/B848 49; ‒ ‒ 1783, p. 
298).
7.4 Experiments and Heuristic Principles
In the previous section we have seen that, for Kant, principles play a role after we perform 
experiments. They enable us to convert experimentally confirmed hypotheses into laws of 
nature. However, there are also principles which play a role before we perform experiments. 
They are principles that we follow in order to formulate hypotheses to be tested by means of 
experiments. When we perform experiments, “we must always first presuppose something 
here (begin with a hypothesis) from which to begin our course of investigation, and this must
come about as a result of principles” (Kant 1798a, p. 223 – italics added; see 1942, p. 1991 3‒ ).
What principles is Kant referring to? To the extent that we are aware of them, the 
transcendental and metaphysical principles are involved in the formulation and assessment of 
hypotheses. We should only accept hypotheses that are consistent with those principles. In 
addition, three other principles guide the formulation of hypotheses. They are the principles 
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of homogeneity, specification, and affinity. Kant calls them the principles of the hypothetical 
use of reason.
The principle of homogeneity states that “one should not multiply beginnings (principles) 
without necessity” (Kant 1781/1787, A652/B680). Kant takes it to mean that one must always
search for higher genera for all the species that one knows. As an example, Kant mentions the
hypothesis that every salt is either an acid, or an alkali, and the attempts “to regard this 
distinction as merely a variety or varied expression of one and the same fundamental 
material” (A652‒53/B680‒81). The principle of homogeneity is a methodological principle 
which presupposes a metaphysical principle: namely, that natural entities belong to common 
kinds.
The principle of specification prohibits one from assuming that there are lowest species, that 
is, species which cannot in turn have sub-species. This is a presupposition of natural inquiry, 
as Kant explains by taking different types of soil as an example:
That there are absorbent earths of different species (chalky earths and muriatic earths) needed 
for its discovery a foregoing rule of reason that made it a task for the understanding to seek for 
varieties, by presupposing nature to be so abundant that it presumes them. For we have an 
understanding only under the presupposition of varieties in nature, just as we have one only 
under the condition that nature’s objects have in themselves a sameness of kind, because it is 
just the manifoldness of what can be grasped together under a concept that constitutes use of 
this concept and the business of the understanding. (A657/B685)
The principle of affinity derives from the combination of the principles of homogeneity and 
specification. It states that “there is a continuum of forms” (A659/B687): “there are no 
species or subspecies that are proximate [...], but intervening species are always possible, 
whose difference from the first and second species is smaller than their difference from each 
other” (A659‒60/B687‒88; see A228‒29/B281). This appears to be a metaphysical 
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principle, but it has a methodological significance: one must always allow for the possibility 
that there are intermediate species between the species that one already knows. In this 
instance, as was the case for the two previous principles, we have a methodological 
prescription (always look for intermediate species), which depends on a metaphysical 
presupposition (there is a continuum of forms).
The principles of the hypothetical use of reason, like the metaphysical principles of natural 
science, are not inductive generalizations that we form on the basis of experience. We do not 
derive them from the discovery that known genera have lower species, that lower species 
belong to higher genera, and that there are intermediate species between any two known 
species. In Kant’s view, we would not find higher genera, lower species, and intermediate 
species in the first place, unless we previously assumed the principles of the hypothetical use 
of reason as guides for the formulation of hypotheses (A660/B688). For instance, we perform
experiments to test the hypothesis that several phenomena obey the same law because we 
assume that there is a higher genus for every given set of phenomena.xxxii
We do not have to be fully conscious of this assumption in order to formulate hypotheses and 
to test them with experiments. We often exercise our mental powers according to rules of 
which we are unaware. “The exercise of our powers [...] takes place according to certain rules
that we follow, unconscious of them as first, until we gradually arrive at cognition of them 
through experiments and lengthy use of our powers” (Kant 1800a, p. 11; see 1966e, p. 502; 
1966f, p. 790). This applies, for instance, to the rules of grammar, which we discover long 
time after we started following them. The same applies to the principles of the hypothetical 
use of reason.
Although we often follow these principles unconsciously, Kant does not think that we always 
follow them (Kant 1786, p. 472). They “do not say what happens, i.e., in accordance with 
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which rule our powers of cognition actually perform their role and how things are judged, but
rather how they ought to be judged” (Kant 1790, p. 182). They are rules or maxims that must 
guide the formulation of hypotheses (Kant 1781/1787, A666/B694). Like hypotheses, the 
principles of the hypothetical use of reason are “heuristic fictions” (A661/B689) which 
precede and guide experimental activity.
To be sure, the principles of the hypothetical use of reason are not the sole presuppositions of 
experimental activity. Kant argues for the existence of other regulative principles that direct 
empirical research. They are: the assumption that we cannot have sensory perceptions of any 
absolute or insurmountable temporal or spatial limits (A508 9/B536 37); the assumption ‒ ‒
that nature is organized as if it were designed by an intelligent being (A826/B854); and the 
assumption that living beings are constituted as if they obeyed  final causes (Kant 1790, p. 
387).xxxiii Moreover, the principles of the hypothetical use of reason are not only 
presuppositions of experimental activity. They also underlie the systematic organization of 
cognitions. We employ those principles when we formulate a hypothesis which explains 
several phenomena, even if we are unable to perform experiments or observations to test it. If
the hypothesis provides the best explanation of the phenomena, we should accept it despite 
the absence of experimental or observational confirmation. However, if experiments confirm 
the hypothesis, we have “a powerful reason to take as well grounded the unity that is 
hypothetically thought-out” (Kant 1781/1787, A661/B689).
7.5 Conclusion
According to Bacon, Boyle, and Hooke, experiments serve mainly to collect data in view of 
the future construction of natural philosophical theories. Experiments were not typically 
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assigned the function of testing theories and hypotheses. On the contrary, the experimenter’s 
prior natural philosophical beliefs and persuasions were looked upon with suspicion, as 
potential sources of prejudices which could contaminate his experimental activity. On the 
whole, data collection and experimentation were seen as theory-free activities.
By contrast, according to Kant, experiments cannot serve to build a base of data which are 
independent from theories. This is because experiments are always conceived of and carried 
out in the light of our assumptions, expectations, and heuristic principles. These assumptions 
and principles depend in part on the nature of the human mind and in part on the 
experimenter’s convictions and purposes. They give rise to preliminary judgements and 
hypotheses which guide us in the design and performance of experiments.
Kant’s emphasis on the importance of preliminary judgements and hypotheses for 
experiments goes hand in hand with his denial of the Baconian view that prejudices always 
play a negative function. According to Kant, prejudices (or more precisely, preliminary 
judgements) are indispensable for many human activities, including experimentation. 
However, it is necessary to test and assess them in order to either reject them as false, or else 
to transform them from mere opinions to certain truths.
On the whole, compared with Bacon, Boyle, and Hooke, Kant has elaborate views on the one 
hand, on how our theoretical and pre-theoretical assumptions bear on experimental practice, 
and on the other hand, on how the results of experimental activity can be integrated within 
the body of our theories in order to advance our knowledge of nature. However, Kant seems 
to have overstated the dependence of experiments on theories.
First, pace Kant, some experiments are performed in absence of a clear theoretical 
framework. Their aim is not testing hypotheses, but exploring new areas of inquiry or 
circumscribing new phenomena (Steinle 1997). Kant must have read the discussion of these 
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exploratory experiments in a work that he knew well, Johann Heinrich Lambert’s New 
Organon (1764, vol. 1, p. 355). However, Kant never discusses exploratory experiments.
Second, as a consequence of his disregard for exploratory experiments, Kant overlooks the 
benefits of the creative interplay of experiments designed to test theories and hypotheses with
experiments which have a life of their own. Bacon, Boyle, and Hooke also overlooked the 
benefits of that interplay, but for the opposite reason: namely, because they focused too much 
on experiments having a life of their own.
Third, some experiments test hypotheses which contrast with our currently accepted theories. 
They lead us to replace them with new theories, incompatible with the previous ones. Kant 
does not provide any account of how these revolutionary experiments lead to theory change 
or revision.xxxiv On the contrary, he requires that our hypotheses are coherent with the body of 
our previous knowledgexxxv and that experimental results are integrated within a given system,
based on the a priori foundations of natural science.xxxvi
In response to this criticism, Kant could emphasize that exploratory and revolutionary 
experiments are never wholly independent from our theoretical and pre-theoretical beliefs 
and hypotheses. However, he should have acknowledged that they enjoy a certain degree of 
freedom from our theoretical assumptions. This makes them more than handmaids to theory, 
hypothesis-testing procedures, or preliminaries to the addition of new laws of nature to a 
static, ever-growing body of natural philosophical knowledge, firmly resting on unshakable 
Newtonian foundations.
As is well known, developments in science have shaken those foundations and made space 
for more dynamic conceptions of scientific progress. These conceptions make it easier than it 
would have been for Kant to accommodate the interaction between theory-testing 
experiments and exploratory experiments and to explain the roles of experiments for theory 
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change and revision. Arguably, the evolution of Kant’s philosophical views points in this 
direction. The completeness and coherence of the system of natural science becomes more 
and more a regulative ideal when Kant moves from the Newtonian focus of the Metaphysical
Foundations of Natural Science to the thorny status of teleological biological explanations in 
the Critique of the Power of Judgement and the reconsideration of chemistry in the Opus 
Postumum. Yet despite these developments, Kant never retracted the claim that he uncovered 
and enumerated the definitive a priori foundations of natural science.
At any rate, in order to acknowledge the roles of experiments for exploring new territories 
and establishing new theories, it was necessary to highlight the existence of fecund relations 
between experiments and theories. Highlighting these relations is a significant contribution of
Kant’s philosophy of experiment, especially if compared with the views of his British 
predecessors.xxxvii
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151 52) and Walch (1775, cols. 1083 84).‒ ‒
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experiments  for  the a  priori  inquiries  that  he  develops in  the  first  two  Critiques.  On this  issue,  see  esp.
Seigfried (1989), Gloy (1996, 2009), Sato (2008).
viii  I follow Peter Anstey (2005, unpublished).
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x  Boyle’s law states there is an inverse proportional relationship between the pressure and volume of a gas in a
closed system where the temperature is constant.
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xiv  See Newton (1687, vol. 2, p. 764; 1714/15, pp. 222‒24).
xv  See (Kant 1998b, p. 377617 18‒ ).
xvi  See (Kant 1798a, pp. 22314‒20 and 4058‒11). To be sure, Kant distinguishes between prejudices in the proper
sense (Vorurteile) and preliminary or provisional judgements (vorläufige Urteile): see La Rocca (2003).
xvii  See e.g. R 2678 (1764‒75?), vol. 16, p. 465; R 2690 (ca 1780‒89), vol. 16, p. 471; R 2694 (1790‒1804), vol.
16, p. 472.
xviii  See an addition (1770 or later) to R 2130, vol. 16, p. 246; 1800a, 9, p. 8515 16‒ .
xix  See Kant (1966e, p. 594; 1998b, pp. 476 77; ‒ 1800a, pp. 132 33). The inductive pattern of reasoning which‒
leads to the formulation of hypotheses is described in (Kant 1781/1787, A647/B675).
xx  E.g. R 2681 (1776 89?), vol. 16, p. 469‒ 10 11‒ ; R 2687 (1776 89?), vol. 16, p. 471). More precisely, hypotheses‒
cannot be apodictically certain.  On the distinction between apodictic  and assertoric certainty, see Capozzi
(2001, pp. 572 76). By “certainty” I will mean apodictic certainty in what follows.‒
xxi  See (Kant 1966e, p. 517): certainty “is awareness of the necessity of truth”. See also (Kant 1966e, p. 530;
1800a, p. 66).
xxii  Based on Kant (1966e, p. 558); see R 2681 (1776 89?), vol. 16, p. 469.‒
xxiii  Kant emphasizes that hypotheses must be consistent especially with that particular body of knowledge which
is constituted by the “conditions of possible experience” (Kant 1781/1787, A771/B799), outlined in the first
Critique.
xxiv  The first  Critique adds that we should be able to determine the consequences of a given hypothesis a priori
(Kant 1781/1787, A774/B802). I take this to mean that, when we explain how certain events follow from the
assumed hypothesis, we should show that they follow from it on the basis of a priori principles, such as the
causal  law and the law of action and reaction (see Butts  1961, p.  165).  Empirical  laws, besides  a  priori
principles, might be involved in the explanation.
xxv  A discussion of Kant’s views on hypotheses which is rather different from the reconstruction provided here
can be found in Butts (1962).
xxvi  Kant associates the term “law” to necessity (e.g. 1781/1787, A126) and universality (e.g. 1783, p. 310). Kant
(1781/1787, A126) qualifies laws as objective rules and other passages (e.g. 1783, p. 301) relate objectivity to
necessity and universality.
xxvii  See Sect. 7.2.3.
xxviii  Kant  also  mentions  several  chemical  experiments,  but  he  denies  that  the  empirical  generalizations  of
chemistry can achieve the status of laws (1786, p. 468).
xxix  E.g. Bk. 3, Prop. 6.
xxx  This combination of [a] empirical and [b] a priori premises is reflected in Kant’s statement that “the empirical
laws can only [...] be found [a] by means of experience, and indeed [b] in accord with its original laws [a priori
principles], in accordance with which experience itself first becomes possible” (Kant 1781/1787, A216/B263).
Empirical laws can be inferred from the transcendental principles, but not “completely” (B165). “Experience
must be added in order to come to know particular laws at all” (B165).
xxxi  Typically, empirical laws outline necessary features of specific natural kinds: see Kreines (2008).
xxxii  Kant argues that, in order to discover natural laws, we must assume that nature is ordered into genera and
species, in conformity with the principles of the hypothetical use of reason (1790, p. 185). To show this, Kant
explains  how the principle of  affinity  was at  work in  the reasonings that  lead  to  Newton’s discovery of
universal gravitation (Kant 1781/1787, A662 63/B690 91).‒ ‒
xxxiii  See Guyer (1990).
xxxiv  On the forms of scientific progress that are compatible with Kant’s views, see Malzkorn (2000).
xxxv  See Sect. 7.2.4.
xxxvi  See Sect. 7.3.
xxxvii  In acknowledging these relations, Kant could rely on the reflections of his German predecessors, from Wolff
to Lambert. Reconstructing them and the extent to which they anticipate Kant’s reflections is a task that I hope
to take up on another occasion. For valuable comments on previous versions of this paper, I would like to
thank Peter Anstey, Juan Manuel Gomez, Alan Musgrave, and Kirsten Walsh. The paper benefited from very
helpful discussions of audiences at Budapest, Padua, and Sydney.
